

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR FOR USE OF THE
STAFF OF THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING
SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATOR STENNIS

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25 February 1963

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

I. Introduction

The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the daily record of events in Latin America, and [redacted]

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[redacted] all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Communists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow and seize control of the governments in Latin America.

Even before the October missile crisis--and with increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders have been exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and terrorism, and supporting their activities. Cuban support takes many different forms, but its main thrust is in the supply of the inspiration, the guidance, the training, and the communications and technical assistance that revolutionary groups in Latin America require.

In essence, Castro tells revolutionaries from other Latin American countries: "Come to Cuba; we will pay your way, we will train you in underground organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sabotage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda support, send you propaganda materials for your movement, training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret communications methods, and perhaps funds and specialized demolition equipment." Castro is not, as far as we know, promising these other Latin Americans any Cuban weapons or Cuban personnel--either leaders, advisers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them: "If you succeed in establishing something effective by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland, if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and confront regular armed forces, then we may consider more concrete forms of assistance."

So far, it should be noted, none of the movements in South America has reached this final stage--and in fact even Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had

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to fight a pitched battle with regular military formations which might have required more advanced weapons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustaining revolution wherever it flourishes.

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We know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier, from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. We know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that some guerrilla forces [redacted] for instance, are equipped with Czech weapons which most probably came from Cuba.

Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's priority list for revolution. Fidel Castro said so to the recent meeting of Communist front organizations for Latin American women. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in speeches in January.

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Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). This organization is currently trying to publicize its existence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate shootings. These were also designed to dissuade President Betancourt from his trip to Washington. In this, of course, they failed.

The violence in Venezuela should not be minimized. The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go out at night in some sections of the capital. But it

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this level of activity is not the sort of thing that will bring down the government unless the president or other high officials are assassinated. The FALN has not reached a point where it stands up to the armed forces, or seizes and holds government buildings.

We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla training to more nationals from Venezuela than from any other country. Our estimate is that more than 200 Venezuelans received such training in 1962. Many of these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and others were rounded up and given long prison sentences when they committed themselves prematurely last spring in a countryside where the rural population strongly supports the Betancourt administration.

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II. The Cuban Plan

For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been pushing the line that Cuba provides the example for Latin American revolution, with the implication that nothing more than guidance needs to be exported. Castro actually sounded the keynotes for Cuban subversion on July 26, 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent." In his speech on 15 January 1963 Castro said that if "Socialism" in Cuba had waited to overturn Batista by peaceful means, Castro would still be in the Sierra Maestra. For the past three months, Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart, both in public speeches

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have been insisting that what they call "Socialism" can achieve power in Latin America only by force.

The Cuban effort at present is far more serious than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids that the bearded veterans of the Sierra Maestra led into such Central American countries as Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic during the first

eight or nine months Castro was in power. Today the Cuban effort is far more sophisticated, more covert, and more deadly. In its professional trade-craft, it shows guidance and training by experienced Communist advisers from the Soviet bloc, including veteran Spanish Communists.

The ideas move fairly openly in a massive propaganda effort. The inflammatory broadcasts from Havana and the work of Prensa Latina are matters of public record. [redacted]

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The know-how is not only imparted to the guerrilla trainees who come to Cuba, but is exported in the form of booklets. There are thousands of copies of the texts on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung and by Che Guevara scattered over all of Latin America. [redacted]

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All of these textbooks stress that the guerrilla must be self-sustaining. They not only tell him how to make Molotov cocktails, explosives, and incendiary preparations from materials that he can obtain easily and sometimes even openly at home. They stress that his weapons, his equipment, and supplies should come from "the enemy"--that is, from the security forces in his homeland.

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III. Training

We estimate that at least 1,000, and perhaps as many as 1,500 persons came to Cuba during 1962, from all the other Latin American countries with the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training or both. More have gone in 1963 despite the limited facilities for reaching Cuba at present.

The largest contingents have come from Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia. Some of the courses are as short as four weeks, designed to let it appear that the trainees had merely attended some conference or celebration and done a little sightseeing. Other courses last as long as a year, and may include intensive training in such things as sabotage, espionage, and psychological warfare.

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Under the circumstances we consider that our estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 guerrilla warfare trainees in 1962 is reasonably accurate. We also believe that the scope and volume of this training is being stepped up, just as we know that it increased in 1962 over 1961.



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[REDACTED]

such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, where there are indigenous guerrilla forces either in action or in being in the hills, there are Cubans among the bands acting as leaders, instructors or advisors for these forces. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] In some cases, it has turned out that a reference to "a Cuban" with the guerrillas referred to someone who has been trained in Cuba and was training others, rather than a Cuban national. However, we know positively that three Cuban nationals were involved in the strike violence [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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IV. Weapons

In general, the Cubans appear to be following the textbook for guerrillas in regard to provision of arms. [REDACTED]

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[redacted] they are telling the guerrilla warfare students and their leaders to obtain their own weapons at home.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

We do not have a single case where we are certain of the Cuban origin of captured arms.

This is not to say that we are positive weapons have not been sent from Cuba. Latin America has a long tradition of smuggling, a long coastline, innumerable isolated landing fields and drop zones, and inadequate security forces to control all such channels. [redacted]

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In summary, we have evidence that in principle Cuba is not sending identifiable quantities of weapons to Latin American insurgents at present. But we have no reason to believe that they will not or cannot do so, when so doing serves their stated purpose of creating uprisings in Latin American Countries. Needless to say, this is a matter that we consider of most serious concern and we intensively trace every rumor that comes to us of the importation of arms from Cuba to Latin American countries.

V. Funding

Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Our evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying cash. The following are a few examples of these operations.


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
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The principle that guerrillas must be self-sustaining has obviously been applied to finances as well. Communist guerrillas have staged numerous bank robberies in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima suburb last year which netted almost \$100,000. From

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In February 1963 a bank in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of \$25,000 by men wearing FALN armbands.

VI. Cuban Propaganda Broadcasts

International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all

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times, with regularly scheduled and special broadcasts to specific countries as well as general transmissions to all Latin America. The general theme of these broadcasts is that the "Cuban example" is awakening the "people" of Latin America to the opportunity for revolutionary action against the "corrupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism" which allegedly supports them. Within the last two months there has been an increase in the aggressiveness with which the broadcasts incite revolt.

The official Cuban international service called Radio Havana Cuba is the chief radio propaganda outlet. More commonly known as Radio Havana, this station broadcasts weekly a total of 187 hours and 50 minutes of propaganda in languages which include Spanish, English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediterranean area, and the Western Hemisphere.

Radio Havana's international service was inaugurated on May Day in 1961. It has grown rapidly since that time and is now Latin America's first international broadcaster in terms of program hours. Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week:

Haitian Creole to Haiti	- 7 hr
Arabic to the Mediterranean area	- 5 hr 15 min
English to Europe	- 9 hr 20 min
English to the Western Hemisphere	- 17 hr 30 min
French to Europe	- 9 hr 20 min
French to Canada	- 3 hr 20 min
French to Mediterranean	- 3 hr 30 min
Portuguese to Brazil	- 7 hr
Spanish to Europe	- 16 hr 55 min
Spanish to the Americas	- 108 hr 30 min

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In addition to the regularly scheduled international service, Radio Havana has been known to broadcast special programs in order to take advantage of unique political situations. When serious

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Radio Havana states that it makes its facilities available to political groups from other Latin American countries so they can beam programs to their homelands. These programs, which have the evident intent of encouraging subversion and inciting revolt, are presently beamed on regular weekly or twice a week schedule to Guatemala, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. Similar programs were beamed to Nicaragua and Honduras until last September when they were replaced by a single program with wider targets now programmed nightly. These special programs are exemplified by the programs transmitted to the Dominican Republic on 28 January. One was a "manifesto" by Dominican Communists (who are based in Cuba) on the recent election of the "demagogic imperialist agent" Juan Bosch as President of the Dominican Republic. Another was allegedly by a pro-Communist group of Dominicans in Cuba called the "National Liberation Movement." It appealed to Dominican university students to demonstrate against the Constituent Assembly meeting in Santo Domingo.

There are also two special programs beamed to the United States. "Radio Free Dixie" is a one hour a week transmission in English aimed at US Negroes. The other program, "The Friendly Voice of Cuba," is somewhat more subtle and aimed at a wider audience. Both programs can be heard well in Florida and also in many parts of southern United States.

The technical facilities of Radio Havana are at a transmitter site at Bauta, some 23 miles

southwest of Havana. At present, no more than four shortwave transmitters are being used, but in the past as many as five have been observed on the air at the same time. These transmitters range in power from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling Radio Havana to be heard all over the world. Programs are being sent from studios to the transmitter site by means of microwave relays.

VII. Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion

Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has obviously been trying to straddle the rift between Moscow and Peiping over global Communist strategy. It has been aptly put that Castro's heart is in Peiping but his stomach is in Moscow. This same split between all-out militancy and a more cautious policy--call it coexistence or "two steps forward, one step back"--is reflected on the extreme left in many Latin American countries. Thus Cuba at present not only seeks to serve two masters, but to choose among rival servants in its Latin American subversion.

Castro's views on what is good for socialism and revolution in Latin America are more in line with those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets. Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are totally committed to terror and revolution. In spite of differences over tactics and timing between various Communist groups, all intend eventually to deliver the Latin American countries into the Communists-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet "conservative" view, as it is now espoused, is more intent on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible and by subversion rather than by force.

Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly increasing. An excellent example of this was the setting up early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The avowed purpose of this institute is to raise the study of the problems of Latin America, which in their own statements the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest possible level. Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese

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languages is to be stressed in the institute and throughout the school system. A list of subjects on which this institute intends to publish shows that it is to be used to attack the Alliance for Progress; it has already attacked the Alliance program in Colombia--a showpiece of the Alliance. [redacted]

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[redacted] posters have been placed in some Colombian universities referring to the problems of the "national liberation and workers' movements in Latin American countries" as topics which will be studied by the institute. Results of these studies will be published in the near future in a magazine called America Latina, intended especially for distribution in Latin America. A pamphlet, apparently to be distributed by the institute, and entitled Alianza para el Progreso, will in the words of its heralds, "unmask the economic expansion of the USA" in Latin America. The institute also expects to enter into close contact with leading Latin American scientists and academicians during 1963.

One of the most important Communist assets in Latin America is a large number of Bloc diplomatic and Cuban missions. These missions are used to further Communist subversive activities even in countries where there are no Bloc diplomatic missions. The USSR, and in some cases some Satellites as well, have diplomatic missions in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The USSR maintains relations with Bolivia, but has no resident mission there. Cuba maintains embassies in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile. The Chinese Communists have no diplomatic ties in Latin America except with Cuba. That fact alone would make Cuban missions important to the Chinese. Only seven Latin American countries--Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru--have no official ties whatever with any bloc country.

Uruguay offers a good example of how the Communists misuse diplomatic missions and the importance the Communists attach to them. We have found that Communist subversive activities in Uruguay are not now aimed at promoting revolutionary activity against the government. In this case even the Cubans appear to be much more interested in retaining the good will of the government so that they can continue to use the country as a base of operations

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against Argentina, Paraguay, etc. Communist diplomatic missions, however, are active in supporting local Communists and other pro-Castro groups to retain enough leverage within the country so as to prevent the anti-Castro groups from forcing a break in relations. The badly split Uruguayan government itself is anti-Communist, but is highly tolerant of the activities of these missions and of the Uruguayan party itself. The USSR, most of the Satellites, and Cuba all have diplomatic missions in Montevideo--some 70 or so bloc personnel. In addition, couriers and travellers can go back and forth between this city and the bloc countries and Cuba at any time.

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